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In the area of consumer protection, most of the exploratory dis-
cussion and preliminary efforts aimed at legislative drafting, including
the current project of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, have concentrated on the need for protecting
the purchaser of personal goods and services from being deceived in
the process of credit extension and collection. Such deception usually
results either from misunderstanding or sheer ignorance on the part of
the consumer, or is caused by dishonest or unethical behavior on
the part of the credit supplier. It is generally recognized that the
primary impact of protective legislation for the consumer should be
directed to those areas where regulation is actually needed. Concentra-
tion on specific weaknesses tends concomitantly to dismiss from fur-
ther consideration those areas where no problem exists Consumer-
credit legislation, therefore, of ten excludes from its coverage trans-
actions involving sophisticated corporate borrowers, large amounts
of money, and credit secured by investment property such as real
estate or marketable securities. It is the purpose of this article to
point out some of the economic, moral, and legal issues involved in
any examination of the real-estate loan in the context of proposed
consumer-credit legislation.
II. ECONOMICS, MORALITY, AND THE LAW
Economics, morality, and the law are so tightly interlaced in any
consideration of credit cost and disclosure questions as to be nearly
indistinguishable. Yet if a study is to be objective, the significance
of each factor must be weighed independently.
A number of contemporary economists and financiers find it
surprising that the idea of price control for goods and services per-
sists in a capitalistic society, since such measures ordinarily are justi-
fied only in times of national emergency. Arbitrary limits on credit
rates constitute a form of price control comparable to ceilings on the
prices of commodities, and, in the "money market," interfere just as
effectively with the free working of the law of supply and demand.
One of the basic tenets of a free-enterprise economy is that buyers
* A.B., University of Illinois, 1942; LL.B., University of Illinois, 1947; Member,
American Bar Association, Federal Bar Association, Illinois Bar Association, Chicago
Bar Association; General Counsel, United States Savings and Loan League.
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and sellers are expected to compete in open markets for goods and
services, including those of a financial nature. Indeed, apart from
usury laws and some consumer-credit legislation, interest rates are
determined for the most part by market conditions.
Interest rates, including real-estate loan rates, represent the price
paid by the borrower for the use of the lender's money. Rates in the
money market are not established by any conspiracy among financial
institutions or other lenders; when the nation as a whole decides to
spend more money on goods and services than can be financed out
of the current flow of funds, interest rates go up. Although this eco-
nomic principle is well understood in the financial community, it is un-
fortunately not fully accepted by some legislators and a large seg-
ment of the public. The arguments for easy money and low interest
rates are about the same today as they always have been, and tend
to hold the financial community responsible for events over which
it has little control.
It is true that under some circumstances price ceilings cause
little trouble. For example, a ceiling of one dollar per pound placed
on butter would cause little concern today among butter vendors, be-
cause the current price is approximately eighty cents per pound. If
demand increased, however, or the supply dwindled, the price ceiling
would quickly become important. Rate ceilings placed on mortgage
lending by interest-rate limitations and usury laws have had significant
effects in at least ten eastern states.' Several of these statutes have
remained on the books without change since the early days of the
Republic when the economy was largely agricultural, and appear to
be as anachronistic today as the date the legislation bears.' The result
is an economic paradox, since the ceilings which were intended to
help and protect the borrower succeed only in diminishing his local
sources of money; lenders turn elsewhere, primarily to the developing
southwestern and western states, where the rates deliberately have
been set at more realistic levels.
Observers point out that morality and fairness must be considered
in determining the appropriate amount of interest to be paid.' It is
also true, however, that a maximum-interest-rate law cannot be deemed
to be a declaration of any valid moral law. If the collection of interest
1 Those states are Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.
2 For a discussion of general usury statutes as an anachronism, see Note, 65 Yale
L.J. 105 (1955).
"[ED(action of usury is odious, illegal and immoral," said the Georgia Supreme
Court in First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Norwood Realty Co., 212 Ga. 524, 527, 93
S.E.2d 763, 766 (1956). It might be inferred from this declaration of the court that
an interest rate of 8% (which is legal, hence moral, in Georgia) is immoral in neighboring
South Carolina (where it is illegal).
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on money lent is moral at all, it does not cease to be moral at 6, 7, or 8
per cent. Indeed, it would be hard to reconcile any such theory with
the conclusion that the 21 per cent maximum interest rate permitted
in Rhode Island 4 is moral, while any excess over the legal 6 per cent
rate in the nearby state of New York is immoral.'
That arbitrary rate ceilings have little to do with morality is
demonstrated by their across-the-board applicability and their general
failure to make any exception based upon ability or willingness to
pay. A man who borrows not from need, but from an incentive to ac-
cumulate more money has the same rate ceiling applied to his loan
as the "poor" man who borrows to pay his hospital bills. Any alleged
morality of rate-fixing is also questionable in the context of the large
versus the small loan. In Illinois, for example, small loans may bear
annual interest of 36 per cent,' whereas large loans generally are
limited to 7 per cent.' The person unable to offer security for a larger
loan ordinarily has a greater financial problem than the person who
is able, yet for this needier individual a 36 per cent rate is legal, hence
moral, while for the larger borrower 8 per cent is illegal, hence im-
moral.
In some states the identity of the lender determines the "moral
issue." A loan from a credit union at eight or ten per cent would be
countenanced, while a similar loan from a mortgage banker or in-
surance company would not. An interest-rate ceiling applied to a
business corporation contracting voluntarily to repay borrowed money
at a rate in excess of the legal limit also makes little sense as far as
morality is concerned; fortunately this has been recognized by statute
in twenty-two states where corporations have been excepted from
application of the usury laws, Although immorality may be associated
with excessive rates, it fails to follow that a rate ceiling applicable to
all parties at all times is a manifestation of economic morality.
It obviously is impossible for the law to establish a price for
credit that is conscionable in every situation, since all transactions
and all consumers have fundamental differences. This has been recog-
nized in one of the special reports to the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws, which concluded that the "govern-
ment cannot establish a price that is 'fair' to each and every consu-
mer."' Thus it appears that the only practical approach toward re-
4 R . I . Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-26-2 (1956), as amended by R.I. Laws 1966, H.B. 1892,
§ 1 .
5 N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 370 (McKinney 1957).
6 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 74, § 30 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
7 III. Ann. Stat. ch. 74, § 4 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
8 See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 924 (1959).
9 Report of Special Committee on Retail Installment Sales, Consumer Credit,
Small Loans and Usury 30 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Special Committee Report].
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solving issues of economic morality would be for the law to provide
that credit rates must be "fair" or "conscionable," leaving it to the
courts, acting in their traditional role, to decide whether a rate in any
given litigated case satisfies the standard. Provision might be made,
however, for a "conscionable rate floor"—a realistic percentage figure
established by the state within which all interest shall be deemed
"fair." This would aid the courts and reduce the amount of litigation.
Morality, however, does become a significant factor when brought
into a consideration of a borrower's knowledge of the price he is pay-
ing for the use of credit. In addition to condemning a dishonest state-
ment or explanation of such charges, many would find immoral the
practice of quoting a cost-of-credit rate in terms of discount, rather
than interest, when the lender is aware or has good reason to believe
that the borrower either does not know the difference or equates a
five per cent discount rate with a five per cent interest rate. There are
many complex methods of computing cost-of-credit rates, in addition
to incomprehensible disclosure terms, often used by some credit sup-
pliers to confuse or to deliberately misinform the unsophisticated. To
the extent that they are misleading, these practices must be considered
to be immoral. Complete disclosure of the costs of credit to the bor-
rower, stated in terms of indisputable clarity, certainly is an area in
which government standards and regulation are not only justifiable
but highly desirable. The current efforts at both the federal and state
level to enact "truth-in-lending" legislation thus appear to be well
founded in morality and in need, and for this reason should be en-
dorsed in those areas where needed.
III. THE REAL-ESTATE LOAN
Should a loan secured by real estate be included in those types
of credit transactions covered by consumer-oriented protective legis-
lation, or is this an area of lending where current abuses are largely
nonexistent? The following statement appears in the Special Report
to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws:
[The nature of the security taken by the credit supplier]
can also be used to exclude certain transactions. For example,
real estate first mortgage loans have not been a target for
consumer-oriented legislation. Long term real estate financing
is cheaper because the risk and service charge factors are
relatively less. Moreover, information about money costs
is widespread in this segment of financing and competition
is keen. Thus it may be that some credit transactions secured
by real estate can be excluded from the coverage of our draft
legislation. However, the real estate mortgage is being used,
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at least to some extent as a means of financing ordinary con-
sumer purchases. And it may be necessary for our proposed
legislation to cover some real estate transactions. The Special
Committee plans to look into the area of real estate trans-
actions for consumer credit abuses.'"
This is a fair statement, although it is submitted that abuses in the
area of real-estate financing, and particularly in residential financing,
have been relatively nonexistent. This is due to several factors, in-
cluding the type of financing and the types of lenders generally in-
volved in such credit transactions.
Defined broadly, consumer credit includes all forms of credit
extended to individual persons for nonbusiness purposes, such as the
purchase of consumer goods and services and for personal debt re-
payment. Secured loans to enable consumers to build or acquire
homes, however, traditionally have been excluded from consideration
in this context." Such loans typically are for large sums, extend for a
long term (such as twenty or twenty-five years), and are secured by
immobile property having a long life. Another reason for the separate
and unique treatment of real-estate loans has been the huge volume
and significance of the business.
Approximately sixty-three per cent of American families own
their own homes.' Investment in real estate represents more than
half of the total wealth of the country. Housing is greatly affected with
the public interest, but in a context somewhat different from the
interest in preventing abuses in consumer-credit practices. Home-
ownership is traditionally promoted by the government as a factor
contributing to the political, social, moral, and ideological stability
of the citizenry, and as a powerful economic goad to the accumulation,
of savings and capital. The purchase of a residence, typically with the
aid of a mortgage, actually has more of the hallmarks of an investment
than of an expenditure for consumption."
141 Id. at 17.
' 1 A noted commentator in the field has observed:
The characteristics of real property, such as its physical durability and its relative
stability in value, are such that real property, when offered and taken as security,
materially affects the nature of the credit arrangement to which it relates. As a
result, credit arrangements secured by real property, the interaction giving
rise to such arrangements, and the system of legal prescriptions which have
evolved to regulate such arrangements are sufficiently different from other
consumer credit arrangements to require separate review and analysis.
Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 14 (1965).
12 United States Savings and Loan League, Fact Book 42 (1966).
13 Today, a family looks upon a home as an investment rather than as a
family possession to be held for generations. Because of the great mobility of
the American people, the home is no longer passed down to children and grand-
children. While it still is the center of family life and still has deep emotional
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The buyer of a home, like other investors, is typically an indi-
vidual who knows what he is doing. He has planned for a long time
to make the investment, ordinarily the largest one of his life. He has
saved the necessary down-payment toward this goal; he is not an
impulse buyer. There appears to be little question that real-estate
credit contributes to the making of an investment on the part of the
buyer, rather than constituting an expenditure for consumption.
The abuses noted in the field of consumer-goods credit have
been notably absent in real-estate financing, largely because (1) the
real-estate lender looks primarily to the security for repayment,
rather than just the personal assets of the borrower; and (2) the
credit cost of a real-estate loan traditionally has been stated in terms
of simple interest, and all incidental costs have been made fully known
to the borrower. Specialists in home real-estate financing, such as
savings and loan associations and savings banks, for example, have
for years performed voluntarily in the same manner that the "truth-
in-lending" proposals would require for all lenders. In addition, the
risks in real-estate lending of ten are not as great as those inherent
in most consumer-goods financing; credit rates are determined with
this factor in mind, and the market has generally proved to be a fair
regulator. In states having realistic usury limits or where mortgage
lenders are exempted from the usury laws, mortgage interest rates
are not notably higher than in states having a low, applicable ceiling;
indeed, in some instances such rates have been lower."
It is true, of course, that real-estate credit can also be used under
certain circumstances for the purchase of consumer goods. It should
and social roots, the owner has come to consider his home also as an invest-
ment, as a means of building equity and as a form of savings.
Ibid. An editorial in House and Home, Oct. 1966, p. 79, contains the following example:
A little arithmetic can prove to a potential buyer that over a 25-year period
a house will cost nothing while his automobiles will cost him $22,656. Assume
the buyer takes out a 25-year, $20,000 mortgage on a $25,000 house. At 7% he
will pay $42,408 on the mortgage in 25 years, but income tax deductions of
$22,408 in interest will give him an effective rebate, in the 30% bracket,
of $6,722. So his house will actually cost him $35,686 in mortgage payments
plus his $5,000 downpayment—or a total of $40,686. But using the most con-
servative estimates of increasing value, the house will be worth at least
$40,000 after 25 years—and that figure does not include an annual 1.2% in-
flationary factor in the value of money. In short, he will be able to get back
every bit of money he has put into his house purchase. So if he sells the house,
it will have cost him nothing. Let's also assume that the homebuyer buys
eight cars and keeps each for three years—and that each car is worth approxi-
mately $4,000 and is financed at 12%. At the end of the 25-year period, he
will have paid about $23,000 for his cars and will wind up with only one car
valued at about $1,600.
14 In Rhode Island, for example, the usury rate is fixed at 21%, R.I. Gen. Laws
Ann. § 6-26-2 (1956), as amended by R.I. Laws 1966, H.B. 1892, § 1, and the current
home mortgage rate on existing homes is 6;4%, according to the Federal Savings League
of New England. In New York, the usury rate is set at 6%, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 370
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be borne in mind, however, that the use to which the credit is put
does not change the primary characteristic of the loan as being real-
estate secured. The "purpose test" is generally considered to have
little merit in determining which transactions should be subject to
consumer-credit-type legislation?' Indeed, the high cost of consumer
credit was one of the considerations behind the introduction more than
two decades ago of the "open-end" mortgage, a prime example of the
beneficial impact that marketplace regulation can have. Under the
open-end mortgage the homeowner arranges in advance the maximum
amount of his mortgage and is thereafter allowed to borrow from time
to time on his real-estate loan up to either the original loan amount or
to some other stated figure based on property value? Such a pro-
vision is made a part of the recorded mortgage contract and means
that the additional advances can be obtained without the expense of
title search, new appraisal, and other costs that ordinarily are attached
to the refinancing of a real-estate loan. By the judicious use of these
real-estate mortgage instruments, families can realize a substantial
saving in credit costs.
The family that buys a $4,000 automobile and finances it over
the next three years at a 6 or 7 per cent mortgage credit rate may
save hundreds of dollars after it repays this advance on its mortgage.
On such a purchase, for example, if $4,000 were borrowed at a 5 per
cent add-on rate payable over three years, the cost of the loan would
total $600. The same amount borrowed at the 6 per cent mortgage
rate (computed by the declining-balance method), and repaid in the
same time, would cost only $380 or over 36 per cent less. Of course,
such families must discipline themselves to prepay the additional
part of the real-estate loan within the three-year period if the fullest
savings possible in interest cost is to be realized.
Abuses in the use of the open-end advance are virtually unknown.
The credit rate has customarily been extended and expressed as simple
annual interest, without additional fees and charges, thus making
the transaction more comprehensible to the borrowing family? Since
true annual interest charges can range from 18 to 42 per cent at small
loan companies, 12 to 34 per cent on car loans arranged through
(McKinney 1957), and the current home rate is the same. Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, Interest Rates and Other Characteristics of Conventional First Mortgage Loans
Originated on Single-Family Homes, Sept. 1966.
15 Special Committee Report 14. "[I]n the area of loan credit the purpose test
seems least satisfactory as it is impossible for lenders to police the use their borrowers
make of the funds loaned." Ibid.
18 See Hoagland & Stone, Real Estate Finance 40-41 (3d ed. 1965).
17 On signature loans and other short-term credit loans, the borrower is immediately
confused by such terms as discount, add-on, or so-much-per-month on the unpaid
balance.
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auto dealers or finance companies, and 18 to 20 per cent or more on
installment purchases through retail outlets, a family has a marked ad-
vantage in being able to treat its real-estate mortgage as a savings ac-
count toward the purchase of consumer goods.
The fact that the great majority of real-estate loans are made
by regulated financial institutions is another reason for the almost
total lack of abuses in this field. Savings and loan associations, com-
mercial banks, and savings banks extend 62.6 per cent of all real-estate
loans," and are closely regulated and supervised by the state and
federal governments. Similar control is exercised over credit unions
and insurance companies and government-backed real-estate lending
programs such as the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration. Indeed, all federal savings associations are required
"to provide for the sound and economical financing of homes.' Such
institutions also must supply the borrower with comprehensive closing
statements of costs. Thus, additional state-imposed record-keeping and
reporting requirements would be burdensome and duplicative.
Real-estate lending should not be subject to further regulation
under consumer-credit laws, since, in effect, this area has already been
discriminated against by the operation of the nation's many archaic
usury laws. An objective appraisal of the economic scene reveals a
preponderance of legislative and tax policy which favors the borrower,
and very little which favors the real-estate lender. In housing, small
business, agriculture, and a dozen other fields, government is deeply
involved in the facilitation of borrowing by firms and individuals.
Comparable encouragement to the private savers of capital—the po-
tential lenders—to accumulate and make available the funds needed
for such programs are somewhat rare. The unrealistic usury laws
generally applicable to real-estate lending are examples of this govern-
mental approach that has led to unfortunate and unexpected results.
Far from helping the borrower, as intended, such limits have succeeded
only in impeding both borrower and lender, and have served to ham-
per private mortgage lending by restricting the flow of needed funds
for prospective homeowners. This paradoxical result serves as a
reminder that the marketplace regulator best serves the interests of
all concerned. The obvious remedy, of course, is to eliminate the
archaic usury limits, but public misunderstanding of the issues is a
powerful deterrent.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is beyond question that there is a need for consumer-credit
regulation, and that this is justified by economic, moral, and legal
18 52 Fed. Reserve Bull. 1506-07 (1966).
19 Banks and Banking, 12 C.F.R. § 544.1 (1963).
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considerations. It is submitted, however, that the most viable approach
is to provide didactic standards and procedures for the advertising
and disclosure of interest and other credit costs, assuring that every
borrower will be advised of these costs on a uniform basis in terms
which he can easily understand. This is not to say, however, that the
government should do his thinking or make the choice of alternatives
for him. Choice, following knowledge, should be left to the citizen,
who, after all, has a right to make an uneconomic contract. The danger
of overprotection was put succinctly in a recent editoral in a Chicago
newspaper:
We see evil in a viewpoint that regards the public as "people
who have neither taste, judgment, nor hope, but only a
swollen and diseased desire for the accumulation of things
that is constantly irritated and enflamed by forces of the con-
spiracy." We prefer to regard the public as human in its
desire for better things, yes, but also as independent-minded,
discerning, quick to spot and reject fraud and, thanks to the
competitive system, utterly free to do so. As to the viewpoint
that the public is, indeed, a mass of guinea pigs meekly being
herded to and fro, this has an unvarying corollary: That
the herd needs constant tending, constant protection from
the unspeakable folly of its own miserable judgment. In a
word, the critics of the competitive system stand ready as
Big Brother to usurp the decision-making function at every
juncture. If there is, indeed, an "unholy conspiracy against
the American public," perhaps here is a more logical place to
look for it. 2°
Assuming that comprehensive disclosure and a comparison of
rates are available to a discerning borrower, the marketplace is then
the best regulator of credit costs; competition will eliminate those who
supply credit at unconscionable rates. In those few remaining cases
where a particular consumer feels that the cost of credit is "unfair,"
the matter should be decided by the courts or administrative agencies,
although consumer-credit laws might very well provide for a "con-
scionable rate floor."
The real-estate lending area, as it exists, is outside of the area
where corrective consumer-credit measures are needed. Real-estate
credit is being supplied, not only at reasonable rates, but with a full
disclosure to the borrower of the cost of such credit in easily under-
standable terms. State collection and foreclosure laws are rapidly
being updated, with a preponderance of attention being given to fair-
20 Chicago Daily News, Nov. 22, 1965, p. 8, col. 2.
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ness and to protection of the borrower's interests. While elimination
of archaic usury limits unquestionably is needed, the characteristics
and volume of real-estate credit dictate that it be treated uniquely and
separately from the treatment contemplated for consumer credit
under current proposals to develop a uniform law. Problems such as
those resulting from the failure, under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, to adequately distinguish real-estate loans from com-
mercial credit, would then be avoided!'
It is recognized, of course, that some states will choose to enact
consumer-credit statutes applicable to all nonbusiness-purpose credit,
including real-estate loans. In such cases, real-estate credit probably
would not suffer from being included under any cost disclosure pro-
vision, for most such credit suppliers already comply with the con-
templated requirements. Should rate ceilings be adopted as part of
this statutory treatment, however, it is submitted that real-estate
credit should be excepted, or at the very least, if it is to be treated
as consumer credit, be subjected to the same realistic ceilings that may
be applied to other forms of consumer credit. In the few states clinging
to the obsolete six per cent usury law, any relaxation of the present
usury ceiling would be a welcome aid to the cause of homeownership,
and hence to the economy in general.
21 See Pfeffer, Uniform Commercial Code—Adverse Effect on Real Estate Mort-
gages, 29 Leg. Bull. 201 (1963); Shanker, An Integrated Financing System for the
Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture Problem Under Sec-
tion 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 Yale L.J. 788 (1964).
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